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INTRODUCTION
T lie Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 ("CAAA") were signed
into law by President Bush on November 15, 1990.' Prior to
the enactment of CAAA, no federal environmental statute contained
such broad compliance provisions along with specific enforcement
criteria. The "compliance certification" requirement of this latest
federal environmental statute has become the raison d'etre for in-
dustries and the business community at large to pay heed.2 "Com-
pliance" and "compliance audit" have become the latest buzzwords
in the environmental community.
The word "audit" in this context conveys a more subtle, yet
extensive, meaning than its ordinary plain English version. An
environmental compliance audit ("compliance audit") is much more
than a routine examination of accounts or claims. In its Environ-
mental Auditing Policy Statement of July 9, 1986, the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency ("EPA") defined a compliance audit as "[a]
systematic, documented, periodic and objective review by regulated
entities of facility operations and practices related to meeting envi-
ronmental requirements.
3
* J.D., 1988, Fordham University; Ph.D., Chemical & Environmental Engi-
neering, 1972, University of Maine. The author is partner-in-charge of the Envi-
ronmental, Health and Safety Practice Group of Pepe & Hazard, a business law
firm in Connecticut.
1. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat.
2399, 2684-85 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7671q (1994)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(3).
3. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004, 25,006
(1986) [hereinafter Final Auditing Statement].
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When performing a compliance audit, a business must check
federal, state, and local statutes, regulations, codes, and ordinances
to ensure full compliance with each. A compliance audit thus re-
quires a full-fledged inquiry into, and scrutiny of, the total environ-
mental standing of a business or commercial entity with respect to
applicable laws and regulations, no matter how imprecise or ill-
defined they may be.4
Against this backdrop, it is important that a compliance audit not
be relegated to assignment as a routine responsibility of lower level
in-house technical personnel and mid-level managers. The new
statutory and regulatory provisions require a commitment from the
highest levels of management of a corporation to comply with all
statutory and regulatory requirements to protect the environment
and public health.5 Any lapse in this commitment can be extremely
costly, both at professional and personal levels. The sanctions for
non-compliance can include both civil penalties and imprisonment,
and they may very well apply to the top level of a corporation's
management.
The regulatory agencies, including the Department of Justice
("DOJ"), have proclaimed that federally enforceable regulations
need "sharp teeth" to prevent violations and to keep the regulated
community honest and law-abiding.6 The regulatory agencies tout
the benefits of undertaking a compliance audit as a practical tool to
establish and maintain a corporate compliance record.7 They also
4. See generally Thomas E. Lindley & Jerry B. Hodson, Environmental
Audit Privilege: Oregon's Experiment, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1221
(Oct. 29, 1993).
5. John L. Payne, Environmental Auditing: Beyond Due Diligence, C945
ALI-ABA 317, 324-31 (Oct. 6, 1994).
6. See generally Joe D. Whitley & Trent B. Speckhals, Increased Prosecu-
tion is Predicted, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 5, 1994, at Cl, C4.
7. Both EPA and DOJ have suggested that the findings of voluntary environ-
mental compliance audits will generally not be used against the companies by the
government. See EPA, Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 50 Fed. Reg.
46,504 (1985) (initial statement) [hereinafter Interim Guidance]; Final Auditing
Statement, supra note 3, at 25,004; Voluntary Environmental Self-Policing and
Self-Disclosure Interim Policy Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,875 (1995) [hereinafter
Interim Policy]; Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction
and Prevention of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995) [hereinafter Final Poli-
cy]. For the DOJ's statement on this issue, see FACTORS IN DECISIONS ON CRIMI-
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emphasize that only through a compliance audit's comprehensive
probative inquiry into business and operational activities will top
executives be able to check the environmental pulse of their corpo-
rations.8
The compliance audit is strictly voluntary.9 Unlike other formal
audits, there is no statutory or regulatory requirement for any com-
mercial or business entity to undertake a compliance audit. At this
time, a federal or state agency may only include provisions of a
compliance audit as part of a settlement agreement with a party
which allegedly failed to comply with applicable environmental
laws.1"
There are subtle differences between a compliance audit and a
commercial audit. A commercial audit is often the work of one
professional group; a compliance audit is an all-encompassing ex-
amination of multiple aspects of a business operation by profession-
als of several disciplines." These professionals, such as environ-
mental scientists, engineers, geologists, and lawyers, bring not only
their knowledge of environmental issues, but also their trained eyes
and ears to spot potential environmental problems and potential
NAL PROSECUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF SIG-
NIFICANT VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE OR DISCLOSURE EFFORTS BY THE VIOLATOR
(July 1, 1991) [hereinafter DOJ Memorandum], quoted in Restatement of Policies
Relating to Environmental Auditing, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,455, 38,458 (1994).
8. The EPA's interim policy offers a reduction in civil penalties if the com-
pany that discovers a violation during its audit satisfies seven criteria specified in
the interim policy. See Interim Policy, supra note 7; see also Lisa G. Dowden,
The Case in Favor of an Environmental Audit Privilege, 29 Chem. Waste Lit.
Rep. 174 (Jan. 1995). The Department of Justice is not a party to EPA's interim
policy. However, it has announced, through its environmental enforcement policy,
that all voluntary compliance efforts including environmental audits will be favor-
ably considered in its prosecutorial discretion. See Restatement of Policies Relat-
ing to Environmental Auditing, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,455, 38,458 (1994) (quoting DOJ
memorandum).
9. See Michael Herz, Environmental Auditing and Environmental Manage-
ment: The Implicit and Explicit Federal Regulatory Mandate, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1241 (1991).
10. Typically, an environmental compliance audit is required of a company by
an administrative order, consent order, or decree. Hence, this is often negotiated
in a settlement posture between a company and an agency. Id. at 1252.
11. For a discussion of multiple-discipline requirements for conducting a
successful audit, see Payne, supra note 5, at 324-25.
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liability resulting from failure to address such problems promptly
and properly.' 2
Due to the breadth and depth of such an inquiry, a compliance
audit sets itself apart from the typical Phase I or Phase II environ-
mental investigation of a property that is often undertaken by the
seller or the prospective buyer of a piece of real property. 3 While
a compliance audit can be undertaken in contemplation of an acqui-
sition or merger, often as a supplement to a transactional audit
based on a Phase I or Phase II environmental investigation, it is
generally undertaken as an ongoing review of the compliance re-
cords of a business entity. Its basic purpose is to reveal any actual
or potential environmental violation and to alert the corporate man-
agement so that necessary remedies can be undertaken.
This Article delineates various legal issues that may confront a
corporation when determining whether it should undertake a volun-
tary environmental compliance audit. Part I discusses the contents
of a compliance audit. Part II provides a legal perspective on the
burdens and benefits of compliance audit preparations. Part III
describes the position of the various cognizant government authori-
ties and examines the dilemma that industry finds itself in as a
result of the current regulatory position of government. Part IV
outlines the legal privilege and confidentiality afforded to industry.
Part V details the legal obligation of disclosure under a variety of
regulations. Part VI examines the conflicting obligations that face
industry when conducting voluntary audits. Part VII discusses the
risks associated with conducting voluntary audits. Part VIII pro-
12. See generally STEPHEN HOFFMAN, PLANNING, STAFFING, AND CON-
TRACTING AN ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT, ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT HANDBOOK
SERIES (1989).
13. In the context of a purchase or sale of a piece of real property, a transac-
tional environmental audit is often performed. Although there is no fixed format
or scope for undertaking such site investigations, they are often categorized as a
Phase I or Phase II environmental audit. Typically, a Phase I audit will be limited
to general site survey, agency file review, historical ownership and usage of the
property, and interviews with property owners and users. Phase II goes beyond
Phase I by including sample collection and analysis, a detailed land-use evalua-
tion, and a more comprehensive site survey, including the location of the property
vis-a-vis other important industrial and commercial properties in the
neighborhood. See Payne, supra note 5, at 15-31 for a detailed account of Phase
I, II, and III audits.
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vides possible solutions to the compliance auditing quandary and
concludes that, for now, a prudent corporation should avail itself of
common law evidentiary privileges when undertaking a voluntary
compliance audit.
I. CONTENTS OF A COMPLIANCE AUDIT
There are no laws which require the performance of a compliance
audit. Nor are there any legally established patterns for conducting
such audits. The content and format of a compliance audit have
been left to the imagination of the auditors. The role of a compli-
ance audit in the total environmental quality management
("TEQM") of a business implies that it should be conducted ac-
cording to appropriate legal standards and requirements.'4
Common sense would seem to dictate that every business entity
should design its compliance audit to reflect its business, operation-
al activities, and organizational structure. At the very minimum, a
typical compliance audit should include a thorough compliance pro-
file of a facility in order to appreciate fully the effectiveness of its
overall environmental program and to reveal any actual or potential
areas of non-compliance. 5
In the pro-enforcement 1990s, a comprehensive compliance audit
is de rigueur for ensuring statutory and regulatory compliance. A
compliance audit should be undertaken by a corporation to develop
a current compliance profile of a business entity to enable manage-
ment to understand the so-called environmental health of the busi-
ness operation and to plan accordingly to avoid future pitfalls and
associated environmental liability.'6 Hence, a compliance audit
14. James R. Moore et al., Why Risk Criminal Charges by Performing Envi-
ronmental Audits?, [July-Dec.] Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, 503, 504 (Sept. 18,
1991).
15. The goal of a compliance audit is to determine the status of the
company's environmental compliance. It is generally used as a practical tool to
establish the effectiveness of current environmental efforts. An environmental site
assessment, on the other hand, is undertaken by a company that is a party to a
commercial real estate transaction to determine the existing environmental condi-
tions of real property that is on the selling block. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL
AUDITS (Government Institutes, Lawrence B. Cahill & Raymond W. Kane eds.,
1989).
16. See, e.g., People v. Matthews, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1052 (Ct. App. 1992)
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should be geared toward revealing all essential environmental and
regulatory aspects of business activities, including, but not limited
to, permit and registration programs, handling and storage of raw
materials and finished products, record keeping, clean-up and notifi-
cation procedures for accidental releases, off-site transportation and
disposal of waste materials, and a company-wide appreciation of
TEQM.17
The heart of a compliance audit, arguably, is the gathering and
analysis of pertinent data, information and records, along with their
complete dissection by using the statutory and regulatory scalpel to
reveal the true environmental health of the corporation. This data
gathering, however, should not be limited to corporate records and
files. It must include review and inspection of appropriate agency
files, along with a legal inquiry as to what federal, state and local
laws, and attendant regulations may apply in a particular situation,
and whether or not the corporation is in compliance with them. 8
(holding officer of a corporation liable for environmental violations even though
it may have been objectively impossible for him to control all activities of the
corporation). It is often said that ignorance of the law is no defense. Innocence,
however, may indeed be a good defense. Both EPA and DOJ officials have re-
peatedly stressed their uncompromising intolerance for environmental crimes and
noncompliance in general. Since corporate management may not always be fully
involved and, thus, aware of all environmental noncompliance, it may, in reality,
remain completely ignorant of major environmental violations by the corporation.
A comprehensive compliance audit can uncover such violations, thereby allowing
the management to promptly correct the problems. This, in turn, can effectively
reduce, if not completely eliminate, any resulting penalties.
17. The term "total environmental quality management" is suspected to be
derived from the common business term of "total quality management," which
was introduced during the 1970's by the management pundits as a worthy corpo-
rate goal. In reality, it means full environmental compliance through pro-active
plans and effective management of all environmental matters ranging from per-
mitting to reporting and clean-up. See generally E. Donald Elliott, Environmental
TQM: Anatomy of Pollution Control Program that Works!, 92 MICH. L. REV.
1840 (1994) (reviewing QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SUBCOMMIT-
TEE, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, TOTAL QUALITY
MANAGEMENT: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION (1993)).
18. In this respect, an environmental compliance audit resembles a typical
environmental audit, Phase I or Phase II, or both.
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II. A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
There is a valid concern that any voluntary undertaking of this
type will needlessly expose a corporation to legal liabilities and
sanctions. 9 There is also a question of current or future vulnera-
bility should a corporation lack knowledge of its actual compliance
status.20 Ignorance of law can hardly be used as a defense for non-
compliance.
Both of these well-articulated positions have real merits, and
there is no easy answer to the question of whether it is better to be
knowledgeable or ignorant of non-compliance. There is, of course,
the consolation that one cannot violate any law or regulation for
failure to undertake a compliance audit. In the United States, unlike
many Western European countries,2' a compliance audit is not
mandatory.22 Also, the majority of what is required by a compli-
19. There are both statutory and regulatory sanctions for environmental viola-
tions. Depending on the nature of the violation or non-compliance, the penalties
may include fines and criminal sanctions. See 42 U.S.C. § 9609 (1994) (an exam-
ple of civil fines under CERCLA); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1994) (an example of
criminal penalties for RCRA violation). The responsible corporate officer doctrine
allows the government to convict an officer even though such officer lacks direct
knowledge or intent. This doctrine rests on negligence theory and can therefore
be invoked based on the findings of past violations. The doctrine was articulated
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). This case is
often credited as the inspiration of statutory and regulatory provisions requiring
that permit applications and reports be certified by a responsible corporate offi-
cer.
20. See Edmund B. Frost, Voluntary Environmental Compliance Audits: A
DOJ Policy Failure, [July-Dec.] Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, 499 (Sept. 18,
1991); Moore, supra note 14, at 504-05.
21. In most Western European countries, environmental compliance auditing
is commonplace. It is generally undertaken whenever there is a property transfer.
This also forms the basis for which permits must be obtained by an entity. A
proposed Directive of the European Union would require environmental audits to
be performed at many industrial facilities. See generally Alistair Clark, Environ-
menial Due Diligence in the European Community, presented at the SECOND AN-
NUAL CONFERENCE ON PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, The American Bar Association, Stamford, Con-
necticut (Apr. 18, 1991).
22. As of now, no environmental statute or regulation, either at the federal or
state level, requires the performance of an environmental compliance audit. It
can, however, be imposed as a specific condition of an administrative consent
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ance audit can be performed by the corporation's own employees,
without resorting to outside experts, except where specifically need-
ed. Furthermore, a compliance audit follows no rigid format or
procedure.
An audit, however, should not be undertaken casually or merely
as a chore. To be meaningful, a compliance audit must include an
in-depth examination of past and present environmental plans, pro-
cedures and programs, past and current administrative orders, con-
sent decrees and the like, and their ultimate resolutions.' By ne-
cessity, a compliance audit should go beyond the cursory review of
in-house files and records. To be complete, it must include a thor-
ough review of appropriate agency files, permit documents and
interviews with knowledgeable individuals, particularly those who
are involved in day-to-day operations.24
A compliance audit may be conducted by using a check-list or by
using long forms. It may be done annually as part of a business
plan or on an on-going basis as part of a regular program. Compli-
ance audits should be conducted-as part of a corporation's regular
environmental monitoring and not only for sale purposes. A compli-
ance audit should be part and parcel of the environmental monitor-
ing program of a business entity.'
The main impetus of a compliance audit is to establish the past
compliance history and to develop a well-meaning compliance
program for a corporation, irrespective of its size, type or loca-
tion. 6 The goal is to establish a comprehensive environmental pro-
order or consent decree when a company is notified of an alleged environmental
violation by a regulatory agency. See United States v. United Technologies Corp.,
No. H-90-715 (D. Conn. Jan. 20, 1993).
23. The purpose of undertaking a compliance audit is to determine current
compliance efforts and whether there are any environmental violations. The goal
is to identify and, subsequently, rectify or remedy such violations. Hence, a com-
pliance audit goes beyond information gathering, which is the goal of an envi-
ronmental audit.
24. A compliance audit, by its very nature, should be sufficiently comprehen-
sive so that its purpose is justified and its goals are attained.
25. This is indeed the current recommendation of both EPA and DOJ, as well
as various environmental advocacy groups. See People v. Matthews, 7 Cal. App.
4th 1052 (Ct. App. 1992).
26. Since environmental issues are almost universal, they have direct and
indirect implications on all business entities, irrespective of their physical loca-
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file of a facility or business, including its past or present non-com-
pliance or potential environmental problems. 7
Much of the apparent benefit of a compliance audit relates to the
certification requirements of the latest federal and state regulations
that are bootstrapped to various permitting programs.28 This certifi-
cation has lately become a general requirement in connection with a
permit application submitted to a federal or state agency. 29 Need-
less to say, it will be unlawful for a senior executive of a corpora-
tion to certify without personally ensuring the truth of the state-
30ment.
tion. Moreover, the nature, and not the size, of a business operation generally dic-
tates the breadth and depth of an environmental compliance audit.
27. Strictly speaking, there is no standard goal for an environmental compli-
ance audit. However, the focus of such an audit is always on environmental com-
pliance issues, whether past, present or future. A comprehensive environmental
compliance audit should look into each of these three stages in order to make the
audit meaningful and complete.
28. The following is a sample of such certification proviso which must be
signed by a responsible corporate official:
I certify under penalty of law that this document and all attachments
were prepared under my direction or supervision in accordance with a
system designed to assure that qualified personnel properly gather and
evaluate the information submitted. Based on my inquiry of the person
or persons who manage the system, or those persons directly respon-
sible for gathering the information, the information submitted is, to
the best of my knowledge and belief, true, accurate and complete. I
am aware that there are significant penalties for submitting false infor-
mation, including the possibility of fine and imprisonment for know-
ing violations.
The certification has become a required and distinct element of both federal
and state environmental permits. See 40 C.F.R. § 270.11 (1995).
The genesis of this certification requirement can be traced to the "respon-
sible corporate officer" doctrine. See 40 C.F.R. § 270.11(d) (1990) for the
mandatory requirement of certification by a responsible corporate officer for
permit application and reports under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act., 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6993(k) (1994) ("RCRA"). A similar requirement has
been incorporated into the permitting programs under most major federal and
state environmental laws. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42
U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1) (1994)("CAAA").
29. Any failure to certify or modify the certification language may be a cause
for denial of a permit, license or any other form of approval by the issuing agen-
cy. See generally 40 C.F.R. Part 270 (1995).
30. This clearly arises from the text of the certification. Such certification,
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On the other hand, complete disclosure of a compliance audit
may bring untold miseries if the audit discovers blatant violations
and shortcuts. In such a case, most evidence of systematic disregard
and willful violations of applicable environmental laws and regula-
tions is fully discoverable. By taking initiatives to redress past
violations in the best way possible, however, management can
possibly win the sympathy of the regulatory agencies.3 This, in
turn, may lower the penalties that may otherwise be imposed by the
enforcement agencies," as the guidelines developed by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission clearly acknowledge such good deeds.33
Unfortunately, there is no current statutory or regulatory protection
for a prior non-compliance discovery by a corporation. Therefore,
by undertaking a voluntary audit, a corporation may subject itself to
involuntary sanctions. The extent of any sanction, however, is a
discretionary matter of the enforcement agencies.34
without establishing the accuracy and truthfulness of the information provided,
can lead to serious sanctions. See United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741
F.2d 662, 666-67 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied Angel v. United States, 469 U.S.
1208 (1985).
31. On November 16, 1993, the advisory working group to the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission on environmental sanctions issued its second draft to provide
sentencing guidelines for environmental crimes. See New Draft on Sentencing
Corporations for Environmental Crimes Released for Review, 24 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 29, at 1331 (Nov. 19, 1993). The draft guidelines developed by the
Sentencing Commission must, however, be submitted to the Congress for approv-
al before such guidelines can be used by the federal courts. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Pursuant to its current policy on voluntary environmental audits, EPA may
exercise a wide range of discretion, including whether the matter should be re-
ferred to DOJ for criminal prosecution. Criminal enforcement by DOJ has thus
far been conducted independently from EPA's administrative and civil enforce-
ment programs. Both EPA and DOJ have announced their intentions to exercise
their discretion if the findings involving past violations are disclosed voluntarily.
See Letter from Richard B. Stewart, Assistant Attorney General, Department of
Justice to Admiral James D. Watkins, Secretary of Energy, and William K.
Reilly, Administrator of EPA (Sept. 14, 1989) (on file with the author).
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III. THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION
The EPA has long recognized a compliance audit program as a
meaningful tool to develop and ensure a workable environmental
management scheme,35 and has been a staunch advocate for volun-
tary compliance auditing by corporate members of the regulated
community.36 After all, an audit accomplishes valuable goals of
the agency. It obtains compliance information and causes effective
remedial measures to take place once non-compliance is found. The
corporation itself becomes aware of its compliance status, and the
agency obtains the same information by means of legal disclosure
without costly and time-consuming site inspections and record
searches. The agency is free to use such information in any way,
including requiring the corporation to rectify all non-compliance
problems. In addition, the penalties based on the findings of a com-
pliance audit can be a quick source of revenue generation by an
agency without going through any fierce budgetary process or con-
gressional approval.37
Not surprisingly, in the 1980s, EPA lost no time launching a
high-exposure selling campaign for the voluntary compliance audit
program as part of its environmental enforcement policy. Armed
with the timely passing of several new-breed federal environmental
statutes in the 1980s, such as the Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments of 1984 ("HSWA"),3 8 and the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
35. See Memorandum from Thomas L. Adams, Jr., Assistant Administrator
for Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring of EPA to various addressees re-
garding Final EPA Policy on the Inclusion of Environmental Auditing Provisions
in Enforcement Settlements (Nov. 14, 1986) (on file with the author).
36. See Environmental Protection Agency, Reinstatement of Policies Related
to Environmental Auditing, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,456 (July 28, 1994) (reaffirming
EPA's Final Auditing Statement of 1986).
37. EPA has broad discretion under specific statutory provisions for adminis-
trative and civil penalties. Monies collected in the form of civil penalties go into
the general pool of the Treasury. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake
Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 53 (1987).
38. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616
§ 232(a), 98 Stat. 3,221, 3,257 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1994))
(amending the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6991 (1994)).
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("CERCLA"),39 as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act ("SARA"),' and especially Title III of
SARA, otherwise known as the Emergency Planning and Commu-
nity Right-to-Know Act ("EPCRA"),4" EPA introduced its volun-
tary compliance audit proposal. On July 9, 1986, EPA officially
released its draft proposal42 to encourage the regulated community
to undertake compliance audits and to indicate the scope of such
voluntary programs.43
In later years, EPA attempted to put some teeth into this volun-
tary program by making the compliance audit a part of its overall
enforcement policy and settlement program." The implicit mes-
sage conveyed was simple: EPA would favor a lenient settlement of
any past or present non-compliance discovered through a compli-
ance audit and promptly disclosed to the agency.45 In a 1991
memo to the United States Attorneys,' Richard Stewart, Assistant
Attorney General of DOJ, suggested that the following factors
should be taken into account by the federal prosecutors to deter-
mine whether to prosecute a company when it voluntarily discloses
the findings of a compliance audit:
(a) whether and how the voluntary disclosure by the company can
substantially aid in the investigation process;
(b) the degree and timeliness of the company's cooperation with
the agency's investigation;
(c) the scope of the company's environmental compliance pro-
gram, including its compliance and/or management audits; and
(d) the result of review of additional factors, for example, past
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
40. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986)(codified in 42 U.S.C. § 9621-
9675 (1994)).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
42. Final Auditing Statement, supra note 3, at 25,004.
43. Id.
44. EPA's environmental auditing policy statement of July 9, 1986 has been
interpreted and expanded by EPA officials through public comments and presen-
tations. Together, they represent EPA's overall policy concerning voluntary com-
pliance audits.
45. See generally Frost, supra note 20, at 499-502.
46. See Joseph G. Block, Good First Step or Hidden Dagger? The Effect of
Voluntary Disclosure on DOJ Prosecutorial Discretion, ENVTL. NEWS (Venable,
Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti) Fall 1991 (on file with the author).
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pervasiveness of noncompliance, implementation of internal disci-
plinary action based on the result of discovery of a violation, and
overall compliance efforts after the disclosure of the violation.47
The Department of Justice has echoed a view similar to that of
EIA.4S As a result, while DOJ agrees to use prosecutorial discre-
tion, it has not agreed to any evidentiary privilege against a cor-
poration that voluntarily discloses its past non-compliance. In
summary, neither EPA nor DOJ has agreed to stipulate that a
voluntary disclosure based on the findings of a voluntary act is
protected and, hence, no penalty should be assessed against the
culpable corporation for coming forward and promptly correcting
any deficiency thus discovered.
In its latest interim policy statement, published on April 3,
1995, 49 the EPA declared that in some cases it will not seek
criminal prosecution if a company voluntarily reports and corrects
any violation to EPA promptly." There is no promise, however,
of an across-the-board privilege or immunity.5 As a result, the
basic thrust of EPA's original policy, that is centered around the
agency's discretion, still remains in place.
The tacit message from EPA rejecting a protective privilege or
immunity has not been lost on the business world. While corpora-
tions initially found certain benefits in compliance auditing, such
as better control of their operational activities and a detailed work
plan for future plant management, they quickly discovered its
obvious pitfalls.52 As of now, there is no single federal environ-
mental statute or federal regulation that forbids prosecution, and
thus protects the regulated community from the long arm of regu-
latory enforcement, when a voluntary audit reveals non-compli-
ance.53 It is therefore no surprise that offering an olive branch
47. Id.
48. See DOJ Memorandum, supra note 7, at 1.
49. See Voluntary Environmental Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure Interim
Policy Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,875 (1995).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 16,878.
52. David Ronald, The Case Against an Environmental Audit Privilege, 29
CHEM. WASTE Lrr. REP. No. 2, 167 (Jan. 1995).
53. See Laurence S. Kirsch & J. Walter Veirs, Environmental Law, NAT'L
L.J., Mar. 11, 1996, at B5, B6.
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by EPA and DOJ in the form of prosecutorial discretion for the
eventual settlement of violations has not swayed many corpora-
tions.54 Many of them find this regulatory program and its un-
derlying policy a cynical ploy by the agency to trap the trust-
ing.55
Historically distrustful of the regulatory agencies, and now
dismayed by this apparent disparity between the agency's expec-
tation and its stated position, the regulated community has largely
ignored the compliance audit. 6 The irony being that both regula-
tors and the regulated community have yet to reap the obvious
benefits of a well-planned compliance audit.
IV. LEGAL PRIVILEGE AND CONFIDENTIALITY
At the heart of the current controversy surrounding compliance
audits and the disclosure of audit findings is the question of what
legal privilege or confidentiality can attach to these audits. If
such audits cannot be legally protected from disclosure to third
parties, including regulatory and enforcement agencies, they may
result in self-inflicted injury.57
At this time, three types of legal privilege offer protection,
albeit in varying degrees, from disclosure: (1) the attorney-client
privilege; (2) the work-product rule; and (3) the self-evaluation
privilege. Under the attorney-client privilege, all communications
between the attorney and the client are considered sacrosanct and
confidential. 8 They are protected by the venerable rule that jus-
54. See Ronald, supra note 52, at 168.
55. See Moore, supra note 14, at 504-05. See also Ronald, supra note 52, at
171.
56. See generally Enforcement, Companies Say EPA Enforcement Policy
Collides with Voluntary Audit Programs, Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 117, at A-7
(June 24, 1994); Cheryl Hogue, Audit Legislation Gains in States, But Some
Predict Slowdown in Future, Analysis and Perspective, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) No.
18, at 882 (Sept. 1, 1995).
57. There is a debate among legal scholars whether a voluntary performance
of an environmental compliance audit will result in involuntary disclosure of past
non-compliance. Some argue that absent such audits, most of the companies that
are not aware of any past violations will have nothing to disclose. As a result,
they argue, any voluntary environmental audit can cause unnecessary risks. See
generally Moore, supra note 14, at 503-09.
58. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
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tice should not inhibit or compromise legal representation to
which everybody is entitled. In a recent case, however, In re
Grand Jury Investigation,59 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the party asserting this privilege must make a prima
facie showing that the privilege protects the information being
withheld.' Additionally, this privilege can only be asserted by
the client, and not by the attorney.6
The work-product rule, on the other hand, protects information
or documents that are collected by an attorney in anticipation of
litigation or in preparation for a trial.62 This protection is limit-
ed, hinging on a qualified claim of anticipated litigation or tri-
al.63 Pursuant to Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, an adversary can ask for disclosure of certain information
thus collected, except for those documents incorporating the
attorney's mental preparation for litigation or trial.64 The request
will be granted when the adversary can show a "substantial need"
for such information which cannot be obtained from other sources
without "undue hardship. 65
The self-evaluation privilege is an emerging legal principle and
may be invoked when certain materials, which indicate possible
violations, are unexpectedly discovered during internal investiga-
tions.' In addition, one may invoke the constitutional guarantee
:59. 974 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1992).
60. Id. at 1071.
61. This privilege belongs to the client and, hence, the attorney cannot waive
it without the client's permission. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas
Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
152. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947). Such immunity,
however, does not apply to documents prepared in the regular course of business.
See United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 296-97 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1985).
63. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3); James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93
F.R.D. 138, 141 (D. Del. 1982).
64. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
65. See 8 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2024 (Civil) (1970); 8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDER-
AL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2025 (1994).
156. The audit privilege legislation passed in Oregon, Colorado, Indiana and
Kentucky creates a self-evaluation privilege for audit reports. This emerging trend
is currently being reviewed by the legislators of several other states. See Dowden,
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against self-incrimination in criminal investigations.67 The Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects individuals, but not
corporations, from any government compulsion to disclose self-
incriminating information or to testify against themselves. 8
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege, which was derived from common
law principles, is the broadest in scope and cannot be compro-
mised, even upon a showing of substantial need and undue hard-
ship. It cannot, however, be claimed automatically. The burden
for establishing the attorney-client privilege lies with the party
seeking to invoke it.69 Furthermore, it is susceptible to certain
pitfalls, including waiver.70 Nevertheless, the attorney-client priv-
ilege provides the strongest legal grounds for protecting privi-
leged information from disclosure. It is important to note that
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence recognizes the privi-
lege of a witness based on the principles of common law.7 In
its Ethical Consideration 4-1,72 the American Bar Association
supra note 8, at 175-76.
67. The protection against self-incrimination as set forth in the Fifth Amend-
ment provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
68. The Fifth Amendment privilege may be invoked in any state or federal
proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, but only by individuals.
In short, this privilege is strictly personal. However, if immunity is granted, an
individual may testify without fear of prosecution. See Gerald W. Heller, Invok-
ing the 5th in Civil Cases, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 6, 1995, at B9, Bll.
69. United States v. First State Bank, 691 F.2d 332, 335 (7th Cir. 1982).
70. See generally, Heller, supra note 68, at B9. A person may waive the
privilege by failing to affirmatively assert it on time, and waivers can occur when
incriminating facts are voluntarily revealed. Id.
71. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the attorney-client
privilege. This rule evolved from the decision in United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). See generally David Sive &
Daniel Riesel, Self-Critical Analysis and Other Evidentiary Privileges May Fail
to Protect the Confidentiality of Routine Environmental Audits, NAT'L L. J., Feb.
6, 1995, at B4.
72. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1981). The
attorney-client privilege enables the lawyer to give sound and informed advice to
the client.
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("ABA") Code of Professional Responsibility also lends support
to such privilege since it encourages clients to seek legal assis-
tance at an early stage.73
Recently, in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the
Philippines," the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that both
the attorney-client privilege and work-product privilege were
waived completely in connection with an environmental audit.75
The facts of the case show that Westinghouse had provided docu-
ments, prepared during an internal environmental investigation by
its outside counsel, to the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") and DOJ.76 The court ruled that these documents were
no longer privileged, particularly after the defendant had made a
specific request for their disclosure.77
In general, any evidentiary privilege is conditional and may
easily be waived.78 The privilege may be waived even when the
allegedly confidential information is disclosed to a third party that
happens to be a regulatory or an enforcement agency.79 Hence,
when a premium is placed on the confidential nature of a doc-
ument, it should not be disclosed to anyone, including govern-
73. Id.
74. 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991).
75. Id. at 1418.
76. Id. at 1418-19.
77. Id. at 1424-25, 1429. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's find-
ing that Westinghouse had waived both the attorney-client and work product
privilege through its disclosure of an environmental audit. Id. In general, any
voluntary disclosure of a protected communication can waive this privilege. See
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
78. It is still debated, and the courts are divided, whether the disclosure of
audit results to a regulatory agency waives the attorney-client or work product
privilege. See Chamberlain Mfg. Corp. v. Maremont Corp., No. 90 C 7127, 1993
WL 11,885 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 1993); Jill A. Hornstein, Paying the "Traditional
Price" of Disclosure: The Third Circuit Rejects Limited Waiver of the Attorney-
Client Privilege: Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 467 (1993); see also In re Leslie Fay Cosmetics Inc. Sec. Litig.,
152 F.R.D. 42, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
79. This is not universally accepted. Under the "selective waiver doctrine,"
information disclosed to a government agency in connection with the
government's investigation does not waive the attorney-client privilege or the
work product doctrine. See also Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1424-25.
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mental agencies, other than the attorney, as such candor may
compromise evidentiary privileges.
The attorney-client privilege is available when the following
distinct elements are present:
(1) verbal and/or written communications between an attorney and
his/her client;
(2) such communications are strictly for obtaining legal advice;
and
(3) the privilege has been claimed and not waived or otherwise
destroyed.8"
Each of these elements requires additional scrutiny to establish its
existence or applicability in a given situation. First, the communi-
cations between the client and the attorney are protected in order
to allow the client to convey all pertinent facts, including the
disclosure of any violation of laws or commission of crimes, and
to allow the attorney to provide a thorough legal analysis of such
facts.8 To assert this privilege, however, the client must be
communicating with an attorney who, in fact, acts as an attor-
ney.82 In United States v. Chevron,83 the federal district court
ruled that Chevron had to establish the existence of the requisite
elements before it could invoke the attorney-client privilege, and,
thus, keep certain environmental reports and drilling studies from
disclosure.84
In Upjohn Co. v. United States,85 the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the definition of the term "client" is not limited to senior
80. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D.
Mass. 1950).
81. The A.B.A. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY provides
broad coverage of attorney-client privilege over attorney-client communications.
It also states that under certain circumstances, for example, when the client in-
tends to commit a crime, the lawyer must disclose such communications. MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(c)(3).
82. The attorney-client privilege rests on the principle that an attorney must
be "acting as an attorney." See Edmond B. Frost et al., Environmental Audits and
Litigation Risks, PROCEEDING OF THE TENTH ANNUAL HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE/INTERNATIONAL, 13-27, 17
(1992).
83. No. 88-6681, 1989 WL 121616 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 1989).
84. Id.
85. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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executives. It may include middle- and lower-level employees so
long as their communications to the attorney are necessary to
undertake an investigation or to render legal advice.8 6 Indepen-
dent agents or contractors, however, are not covered under this
definition of client.8 7Second, the attorney-client privilege may only be claimed if the
communications are made solely for obtaining legal advice.8
This is an extremely important element of the privilege, particu-
larly in a corporate or business environment where there is an
incessant flow of information, both oral and written, legal and
non-legal.89 In Fisher v. United States,9" the Supreme Court
held that the attorney-client privilege is limited to disclosures
which are necessary to obtain "informed legal advice" and which
might not have been made absent the privilege. 9' Obviously,
non-legal communications, even by an attorney, are not protect-
ed. 92 A routine internal investigation by an in-house lawyer
functioning as a corporate manager may not, therefore, be pro-
tected from discovery.
Third, there must be a need for keeping the communications
confidential in order to claim the attorney-client privilege. 93 Any
86. Id. at 394-95.
87. The attorney-client privilege, however, extends to the communications of
an independent agent, such as an environmental consultant or an accountant, if
such agent is an agent of the attorney and is directly employed by and reports to
the attorney. See 81 AM. JuR. 2D Witnesses § 418 (1976).
88. If the attorney renders non-legal advice, such as purely technical or finan-
cial advice, this privilege cannot be asserted. Hence, the attorney-client privilege
may not be asserted in situations where the primary purpose of the attorney's
involvement is not to provide legal service. Moreover, this privilege belongs to
the client, and the attorney cannot waive it without the client's permission. Radi-
ant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 'U.S. 929 (1963).
89. In a corporate structure, this is indeed a difficult task, since the corpora-
tion communicates through its employees and agents. The Upjohn Court held that
the privilege extends beyond those employees of a corporation who decide or
control corporate activities. 449 U.S. at 394-95. But see Consolidated Coal Co. v.
Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 1982).
90. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
91. Id. at 403-04.
92. This is inferred from the formula established in United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
93. Any advertent disclosure of confidential communications results in a
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wide circulation of a document, report, or any other piece of
information will undoubtedly undermine such a claim. In Conti-
nental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Indemnity Insurance
Co.,94 the district court found that a carbon copy of a letter was
outside the protection of the privilege as it was "not primarily
directed to an attorney."95 Accordingly, the presence of an "out-
side" government official in a meeting would destroy the confi-
dentiality of the communication between an attorney and the
client.96 Lastly, the attorney-client privilege can be deemed
waived if one is careless. For example, this privilege is destroyed
if the communications between the client and the attorney occur
in the presence of third parties or are later disclosed to third
parties.97
To claim an attorney-client privilege, all communications be-
tween the client and the attorney must be scrupulously conducted
without any ambiguity regarding their purpose. They should have
an appearance of confidentiality and, if written, should carry
unmistakable tags such as "privileged and confidential" or "pro-
tected by attorney-client privilege." In summary, the privilege can
easily be waived, or may result in a waiver, if communications
are not handled carefully.
B. The Work Product Doctrine
The work product doctrine, according to Rule 26(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, protects documents "prepared
in anticipation of litigation or for trial."98 Thus, this rule estab-
lishes only a qualified protection. In Hickman v. Taylor,99 the
Supreme Court acknowledged the public policy allowing an attor-
waiver of the attorney-client privilege. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LE-
GAL ETHICs 302 (1986).
94. No. 87C-0439 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 1989).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 8.
97. This effectively takes away the "confidential" aspect of the communica-
tion. See generally THOMAS H. TRUrr ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING
HANDBOOK, Chapter 3 (2d ed. 1983).
98. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3).
99. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). This decision, and the work product doctrine, have
been codified in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures.
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ney to work with a certain degree of privacy. The Court also
noted that if discovery of personal recollections of an attorney
were to be permitted, much of what is now written down by an
attorney would remain unwritten."0
The work product doctrine does not provide as broad a protec-
tion as offered by the attorney-client privilege. According to Rule
26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, only qualified
protection of an attorney's "mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions or legal theories" is available under the work product
doctrine.'' In United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., °2 the court
held that the work product doctrine does not apply to documents
prepared by the auditors in response to the requirements of feder-
al securities laws. 10 3
This doctrine, therefore, does not apply to documents prepared
in the regular course of business when there is no litigation being
contemplated. 4 The critical factor in asserting the work prod-
uct doctrine is the imminence of litigation. 5 The courts have
generally recognized a substantial probability, a real prospect, or
an immediate showing as indicative of imminent litigation."
Lastly, as in the case of the attorney-client privilege, the work
product protection can be destroyed by waiver, either through
prior disclosure or by failure to maintain confidentiality. Howev-
100. Id. at 511. See also Daniels v. Allen Indus., Inc., 216 N.W.2d 762 (Mich.
1974).
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). The underlying facts of such documents are not
protected by this rule. See Frost, supra note 82, at 20.
102. 760 F.2d 292 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985).
103. Id. See also 8 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2024 nn.24, 25 (Supp. 1988).
104. The work product doctrine can only be asserted when the communication
is made and the materials are prepared in anticipation of litigation. Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
105. Any assertion of litigation must be bona fide, which means that the claim-
ant must prove that the prospect of litigation was real and not imaginary. See
Frost, supra note 82, at 19-20.
106. There is no specific criterion for establishing imminence of litigation.
Based on the decisions of the courts, however, the burden of proof that litigation
is impending rests on the claimant of the doctrine. See James Julian, Inc. v.
Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138 (D. Del. 1982); Henry Enters. v. Smith, 592 P.2d
915 (Kan. 1979).
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er, like the attorney-client privilege, disclosure to a party with a
common interest will not act as a waiver. The essence of this
doctrine is to protect evidence from disclosure to opposing coun-
sel and his or her client, but not from the rest of the world."°7
C. The Self-Evaluation Privilege
The self-evaluation privilege (also known as self-critical analy-
sis) was created by the judiciary to protect certain internal docu-
ments from discovery.0 8 As in the case of the work product
doctrine, this privilege is based on public policy."° The under-
lying public policy is to promote and foster candid and honest
self-evaluation."0
The application of the self-evaluation privilege to date has been
considerably narrow, and many courts have yet to accept the
privilege or provide specific parameters for its application - as
in the case of the attorney-client privilege. Even those courts
which are receptive to this doctrine will look hard to determine
whether the information being protected actually emanates from
confidential self-analysis and whether its disclosure will promote
or harm the public interest. In Emerson Electric Co. v.
107. See Doe v. United States, 662 F.2d 1073 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1000 (1982); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
108. The self-evaluation privilege was first recognized in a medical malpractice
action. See Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 51 F.R.D. 187 (D.D.C. 1970), affd,
479 F.2d 920 (1973). Since the decision by the Bredice court, most jurisdictions
have come to recognize and accept this privilege where protection of the peer
review process is important. See Frost, supra note 82, at 21; Roberts v. National
Detroit Corp., 87 F.R.D. 30 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Gilman v. United States, 53
F.R.D. 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
109. This privilege is strictly embedded in public policy and has not yet found
its way into any specific federal or state legislation. Moreover, this privilege does
not extend to all legal investigations and enforcement. For example, this privilege
does not apply to grand jury proceedings. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Cir.
K-94-2153, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11854 (D. Md. Aug. 23, 1994).
110. The policy emerged from a realization of the need to balance broad public
access to information and a recognition of the fact that full self-analysis and self-
criticism are not practically feasible without some protection against their fall-out.
See Granger v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 116 F.R.D. 507 (E.D. Pa. 1987);
In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
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Schlesinger,"' the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
company's claim of the self-evaluation privilege after determining
that the information sought was not prepared for internal use."'
In a recent case, however, the District Court for the Northern
District of Florida recognized the importance of a self-critical
analysis or self-evaluation privilege to allay corporate fears that
such would be used as evidence against them."3 The court held
that the documents produced by the company during its investiga-
tion of groundwater contamination were protected from discovery
urder such qualified privilege." 4 The court held that the public
interest in environmental compliance is furthered when there is a
candid assessment of various legal and regulatory compliance and
there is no fear of harm from the prejudicial nature of such evi-
dence." 5 The court defined the scope of this privilege narrowly
and laid down the following four criteria for asserting the self
evaluation privilege:
(1)the information must result from a critical self-analysis under-
taken by the party seeking protection;
(2)the public must have a strong interest to preserve the free flow
of the type of information sought for protection from discovery;
(3)the information must be of a type whose free flow would be
curtailed if discovery were allowed; and
(4)the allegedly privileged document must have been prepared
with the expectation that it would be kept confidential." 6
Recent court decisions in several cases imply that the self-evalua-
111. 609 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 1979).
112. Id.
113. Reichhold Chem., Inc. v. Textron Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522 (N.D. Fla. 1994).
The Reichhold Chemicals court cited the decision in Southern Ry. Co. v.
Lanham, 403 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1968), in order to recognize and affirm the self-
critical analysis privilege. The court, however, also acknowledged that this privi-
lege had not been universally accepted and that it is a limited privilege.
Reichhold Chem. Co., 157 F.R.D. at 527-28.
114. Id. at 533.
115. Id. at 524. But see Koppers Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 847 F.
Supp. 360 (W.D. Pa.), mandamus granted, order vacated, 40 F.3d 1240 (3d Cir.
1994) (holding that self-evaluation privilege does not apply to environmental
reports, records and memoranda).
116. See Dowling v. American Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 426 (9th Cir.
1992); Reichhold Chem., 157 F.R.D. 522.
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tion privilege may be asserted only in private litigation." 7 As a
result, the application of this privilege against the disclosure
request of a governmental entity is doubtful.
The self-evaluation privilege is asserted most often in connec-
tion with SEC investigations. Recent securities cases indicate that
routine environmental audits conducted for internal monitoring
should enjoy protection from private party discovery requests. "8
Even in those situations, however, this privilege is not guaran-
teed, as it represents the balance between two important but com-
peting interests-importance of public access to relevant informa-
tion versus the need for confidential self-analysis and self-criti-
cism."9
V. LEGAL OBLIGATIONS FOR DISCLOSURE
Unfortunately, the regulated community has certain disclosure
obligations under federal, state, and local laws and regula-
tions. ' Even the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment
against self-incrimination is limited. It applies only to compelled
personal testimony and only in criminal proceedings. In Kastigar
117. FrC v. TRW Inc., 628 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See United States v.
Dexter, 132 F.R.D. 8 (D. Conn. 1990); Martin v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., No.
88-0106 (D.D.C. May 25, 1990). Some courts have accepted a doctrine of "lim-
ited waiver," whereby the court will require disclosure to a government agency
without waiving the privilege to a private party. See, e.g., Diversified Indus. v.
Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977).
118. See generally Ronald J. Allen & Cynthia M. Hazelwood, Preserving the
Confidentiality of Internal Corporate Investigations, 12 J. CORP. L. 355-381
(1987); see also In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981); SEC v.
Allied Chem. Corp., No. 77-0373 (D.D.C. Mar. 4, 1977); SEC v. United States
Steel Corp., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9182,319
(Sept. 27, 1979); New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Sloan, 22 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). But see Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that SEC may rely on its
materiality standard to decide whether environmental policies of corporations
must be disclosed).
119. See Granger v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 116 F.R.D. 507, 508 (E.D.
Pa. 1987); Dowden, supra note 8, at 174.
120. There are specific "right to know" disclosure reporting obligations or
notification requirements under several federal environmental laws. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994) (Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1994)
(RCRA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994) (CERCLA).
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v. United States,1'2 the Supreme Court held that one may be
compelled to testify if granted immunity from the use of such
testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings. 122 Currently, un-
der the Clean Water Act, 3 knowledge of an actual or suspected
spill of a regulated substance, whether caused accidentally or
intentionally, can trigger notice and record-keeping requirements
as well as containment and cleanup.
2 4
Historically, an oil spill or release has received the most con-
gressional attention."z Thus, the reporting requirement for an
oil spill has been statutorily prescribed in the original Federal
Water Pollution Control Act of 1972. '26 At present, the Clean
Water Act requires reporting of any non-permitted release of any
regulated substance, such as oil or a hazardous substance.
2 7
The enactment of several major environmental statutes, such as
CERCLA, as amended by SARA, has created additional spill
reporting obligations.' 8 In fact, several federal environmental
statutes and attendant regulations contain specific provisions for
reporting spills or releases of oil, 129 hazardous substances, 30
toxic or hazardous chemicals,' 3' and other regulated materials
121. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
122. Id.
123. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
124. 40 C.F.R. Part 112 (1995).
125. The need for protection and prevention of oil pollution of receiving water-
bodies played a key role in the passage of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994); see Non-Transportation Related
On-Shore and Offshore Facilities, 38 Fed. Reg. 34,165 (Dec. 11, 1973).
126. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994). There are specific reporting requirements
in the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permits is-
sued under the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2) (1994).
127. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (1994).
128. There is a mandatory notification requirement concerning the release of
hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (1994).
1219. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (1994) (Clean Water Act).
131). 42 U.S.C. §§ 9602-9603 (1994) (CERCLA).
131. Under section 313 of EPCRA, any facility with ten or more full-time
employees and falling within SIC Codes 20-34 must file the Form R, an annual
toxic, chemical release reporting form prepared by EPA, each year if it triggers
the threshold amount for usage, manufacturing or processing a listed toxic chemi-
cal in the preceding calendar year. 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (1994); 40 C.F.R. Part
372 (1995).
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into the environment. 13 2 These federal statutes are:
-The Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA") 133 as
amended by the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), along with its latest
amendment, the Water Quality Act ("WQA");34
*The Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA"); 135
-The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act ("CERCLA");136
-The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
("SARA"),137 including the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act ("EPCRA")1 38 as included in Title III of
SARA;
139
*The Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA");' 4
-The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act ("HMTA"); 4'
*The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"); 42
*The Clean Air Act ("CAA");143
*The Oil Pollution Act ("OPA");1" and
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661(c) (1994) (RCRA). In the common parlance of
environmental matters, the word "environment" is often used to indicate air,
water, or land, or some combination thereof. Besides protection concerns over the
environment, almost all environmental statutes contain some provisions to safe-
guard public health. Additionally, the Hazard Communication Standard under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988), includes four
principal disclosure requirements. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1995).
133. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
134. The Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, is a significant amend-
ment to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1387 (1994), and contains specific provisions for toxic pollutants. The Water
Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, is the latest significant amendment to the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
135. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994).
136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
137. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 26, 29, 33,
42 U.S.C. (1994)).
138. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11005 (1994).
139. EPCRA constitutes Title III of SARA and is often referred to as "Sara
Title III," codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11000-49 (1994).
140. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994).
141. 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101, 03, 12, 21 (1994).
142. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k) (1994).
143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
144. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994).
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-The Pollution Prevention Act ("PPA").145
The reporting or disclosure obligations under these statutes vary.
In fact, reporting requirements triggered by a release of a specific
substance or chemical are not always covered in the statute that
otherwise covers handling or management of such chemicals. For
example, spill reportable quantities ("RQs") for polychlorinated
biphenyls ("PCBs") and other toxic pollutants are provided under
CERCLA' 4 and not under TSCA, although TSCA provides spe-
cific statutory provisions to handle and manage PCBs.
Also, the reporting or disclosure obligation is not automatically
imposed on the same parties. In most cases, the owner or opera-
tor of the facility, or the vessel, as the case may be, from which a
release occurs is obligated to report. 47 In some cases, however,
the reporting obligation shifts to the person in charge." Under
OPA, for a spill in a deepwater port, this obligation rests with the
licensee. 49 In other situations, for example under the Naviga-
tion Law of the State of New York,' 0 the person actually caus-
ing the spill or the unpermitted release must report such an inci-
dent."
Since some of these unregulated, unpermitted releases may
result in an explosion or fire and may involve toxic chemicals
that can have a serious adverse impact on public health and safe-
ty, many state and local laws and regulations include comprehen-
sive and multi-party notification requirements.' 2 Such reporting
145. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101-13109 (1994).
146. EPA has established the "reportable quantities" for designated hazardous
substances based on its authority granted by CERCLA. Polychlorinated Biphenyl
is an EPA-listed hazardous substance under CERCLA. See 40 C.F.R. Part 302.4
(1995).
147. See 42 U.S.C. § 11004(c) (1994). See generally Statement of Interpreta-
tion and Enforcement Policy, 43 Fed. Reg. 11,110 (1978).
148. See section 311(b)(5) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5)
(1994). The "person in charge" implies a supervisory employee. However, CWA
does not define this term. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States
v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550 (2d Cir. 1989), held that a low level supervisory employ-
ee may be found criminally liable for failure to report a release. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9603 (1988).
149. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32)(D) (1994).
150. N.Y. NAV. LAW § 175 (McKinney 1989).
151. Id.
152. Most often, based on state and local laws that are written as a result of
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obligations are not preempted or automatically covered by the
reporting requirements prescribed by federal statutes and regula-
tions."'
The obvious implication of the reporting requirements is sim-
ple: the responsible party must disclose certain information within
a specific time period after the occurrence of the incident to
avoid liability that may arise from a failure to report on time.
This requirement cannot be waived or bypassed under the guise
of confidentiality or privilege. Therefore, if an unpermitted re-
lease is discovered during a voluntary compliance audit, the rele-
vant statutes or regulations may require disclosure to various
bodies.
Furthermore, certain public policies require immediate disclo-
sure of known or suspected public hazards. In Kansas Gas &
Electric v. Eye,"5 4 a Kansas court, using a balancing test, held
that the benefit to society conferred by disclosure of certain safe-
ty information was greater than the injury caused to the corpora-
tion by disclosure of the same information."15 While application
of such a balancing test is arguably not widespread, one cannot
be too confident in enjoining disclosure of otherwise confidential
information, particularly when a strong public interest demands
disclosure.
the passage of EPCRA, notices are to be given to the local police and fire de-
partments. Under EPCRA, the state emergency response commission and the
local emergency planning committee must be notified in the event of a release of
an extremely hazardous substance in a quantity that exceeds its "reportable quan-
tity." 42 U.S.C. § 11004 (1994).
153. There are specific state disclosure requirements under state statutes. See,
e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 17-1743 (McKinney 1984); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:1K-16 (West 1992); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25359.7(a) (West
1992); Michigan Environmental Response Act, MiCH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 324.20114 (West Supp. 1995). These reporting requirements are not pre-empted
by the federal environmental and safety laws.
154. 789 P.2d 1161 (Kan. 1990).
155. Id. at 1168.
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VI. THE QUANDARY AND THE CONFLICT
]Based on certain enforcement agenda, the regulatory agencies,
and enforcement officials from DOJ, have come to expect full
disclosure of the findings of compliance audits even though the
audits are voluntary.'56 This expectation is in sharp contrast to
the perceived need of the regulated community to keep such
findings confidential to avoid self-incrimination. The one-sided
positions of EPA and DOJ openly conveyed in EPA's 1986 poli-
cy statement covering compliance audits has increased confusion
and made the parties distrustful of each other.'57 This position
has also dampened the initial interest of the business community
in undertaking compliance audits and, thus, achieving better con-
trol over their respective environmental matters.
Earlier statements and actions by agency officials did not help
in explaining the contents of the 1986 EPA policy statement. For
example, on June 26, 1981, Gary Lynch, Assistant Director of
Enforcement of the SEC, proclaimed that inadequate environmen-
tal disclosures by companies may result in SEC enforcement. 5
Before the dust had settled from this surprise announcement,
EPA's 1986 policy'59 openly suggested complete disclosure
while attempting to persuade the business community to volun-
tarily undertake compliance audits."6 EPA's expectation of full
156. DOJ's own policy encourages the use of its authority to request the pro-
duction of the reports or findings of environmental audits in spite of its stated
goal of encouraging "self-auditing, self-policing, and voluntary disclosure of
environmental violations." See DOJ Memorandum, supra note 7, at 3-4.
157. See generally Marianne Lavelle, EPA: Confess and Pay Less, NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 17, 1995, at A6, A7.
158. Gary Lynch, Environmental Audits Seen Reducing Problems of Hazardous
Wastes, 12 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 9 at 288, 289 (June 26, 1981). Both the Secu-
rities Act of 1933, 15 USC §§ 77a-77bbb (1994), and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 USC §§ 78a-7811 (1994), impose disclosure duties of a broad
range and type of information, including environmental matters. SEC promulgat-
ed Regulation S-K governing these disclosure obligations. See 17 C.F.R. Part 229
(1995); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C.
Cir. 1979). More specifically, the Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 92 ("SAB 92")
imposes a substantial burden upon publicly traded companies to disclose environ-
mental liabilities and possible future "exit costs." See generally Publication of
Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 92, 58 Fed. Reg. 32,843 (1993).
159. See Final Auditing Statement, supra note 3, at 25,004.
160. One can argue that this suggestion is an oxymoron since the suggested
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disclosure became, perhaps unwittingly, a Machiavellian ploy
when it mentioned prosecutorial discretion for settling past viola-
tions as an enticement to such disclosure. 161
Subsequent legislative enactments at the state level have creat-
ed further confusion and mistrust. For example, both New Jersey
and Connecticut have enacted property transfer laws requiring
disclosure and/or cleanup of existing hazardous substances from
industrial properties or establishments prior to their closure, trans-
fer or sale.'62 While these statutory requirements are not volun-
tary, they do not require as broad and sweeping an investigation
as that of a typical compliance audit.'63 Nevertheless, they have
created the misconception that unless real estate is being leased,
transferred, or acquired, a compliance audit does not have any
tangible value. 64
Taken together, the well-touted privilege of undertaking com-
pliance audits by the business community during the late 1970s
and early 1980s has now been shrouded by a veil of suspicion
and confusion. The unfortunate effect is that any discussion of the
action appears to be contradictory to the old theory of quid pro quo.
161. See generally Mary E. Kris & Gail L. Vannellis, Today's Criminal En-
forcement Program: Why You May be Vulnerable and Why You Should Guard
Against Prosecution of an Environmental Audit, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 227
(1991).
162. These statutes require disclosure of environmental conditions in terms of
waste generation and past industrial activities but do not impose any specific
environmental investigation or assessment. See, e.g., Connecticut Transfer of
Hazardous Waste Establishment Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-134, as amended
(1995); New Jersey's Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 13:1K-13 (West 1991).
163. See New Jersey Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 13:1K-14 (West 1991).
164. The property transfer laws of Connecticut and New Jersey have generally
been triggered when the ownership of an industrial establishment generating
hazardous wastes or involving certain hazardous industrial activities is being
transferred or otherwise acquired by a new owner. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 22a-134 (1995). There is no statutory or regulatory language requiring anyone,
including those industrial establishments, to undertake an environmental compli-
ance audit for ongoing operations. See New Jersey Environmental Responsibility
Act, N.J. STAT. § 13:K-6; Michigan Seller Disclosure Act, MICH. CORP. LAWS
§ 565.951 et seq.; ILL. REP. STAT. Ch. 30, 1901; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25359.7(a).
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benefits of a well-conceived compliance audit has a hollow ring.
Very few corporations believe that a compliance audit should be
a part of the operational or business plan of a corporation to
assess its past efforts and to pave the way for future improvement
and goals. Gone are the healthy aspirations of the business com-
munity to get a better handle on its environmental permitting and
compliance matters and to avoid unnecessary, protracted, and
expensive litigation stemming from voluntarily disclosed viola-
tions.
These aspirations have been replaced by a strong feeling within
the business community that undertaking a voluntary compliance
audit is maddening. Any demand to disclose the findings of a
compliance audit to the regulatory agencies has all the ingredients
of self-incrimination, without the protection of the Fifth Amend-
ment. Several state court decisions have added fire to the fury. In
Ohio v. CECOS International, Inc.,'65 the Ohio Court of Ap-
peals recognized that discovery of environmental audits may have
a chilling effect on internal corporate investigations and trouble-
shooting efforts."6 Nevertheless, the court held that internally
generated performance evaluations are not privileged.'67 Unfor-
tunately, the United States Supreme Court has not yet decided a
case involving disclosure requirements of compliance audits.
From a conservative approach, undertaking a voluntary compli-
ance audit should not be pursued unless there is a formal agree-
ment with the pertinent agencies about settling any environmental
violation discovered during such an audit. The possibility of such
agreement is, of course, extremely remote. This puts any potential
benefits that may be derived from undertaking compliance audits
in the category of what could have been or should have been.
Unfortunately, congressional attempts to curb environmental
crimes and other unscrupulous "knowing" or "unknowing" activi-
ties by corporations and their employees have generally failed to
send a proper message.'68 Almost all of the recent federal envi-
165. 583 N.E.2d 1118 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
166. Id. at 1119.
167. Id. at 1121.
168. The term "knowing" has been included in several federal environmental
statutes, including the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act and the Resource Con-
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ronmental statutes contain ambiguous language, largely as a result
of political compromise.169 This, in turn, has left interpretation
and implementation io the regulatory agencies who are equally
influenced by political winds. Finally, it has been left to the
nation's courts to sift through the legislative history and make a
bookish determination of what these statutory provisions require.
As a result, the decisions are seldom pragmatic and, more often
than not, create additional confusion.
VII. THE PRICE AND THE PERCEIVED DANGER
Tough talk by agency and enforcement officials against the
dangers of maintaining poor or incomplete compliance records by
the regulated community has had very little impact regarding the
benefit of compliance audits. The current position of EPA and
DOJ demanding complete disclosure of compliance audit findings
has fallen on deaf ears. Worse, it has resulted in a total lack of
interest in voluntary undertakings. While there may be debates
about whether or not the stepped-up enforcement program by the
agencies will improve overall compliance records, it is generally
agreed that the entire voluntary program of compliance audits has
servation and Recovery Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (1994); 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(d) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (1994). Although the term is not defined,
the courts have generally held that in order to prove a knowing activity or know-
ing conduct, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted voluntarily and
consciously, and not by mere accident or inadvertence. See S. REP. No. 1172,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019, 5038;
United States v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447, 1450 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991). Un-
like the criminal codes, there is no standard based on mental intent or mens rea
to prove the defendant's guilt. See United States v. International Minerals &
Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971). Any "knowing" violation of environmental
laws, or any instance where a responsible corporate manager "should have
known," can be a potential criminal violation under several major environmental
laws. See generally RIDGWAY M. HALL, JR. & DAVID R. CASE, ALL ABOUT
ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING 2-5 (2d ed. 1992).
169. The current debate and dilemma started with the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992, wherein the Congress first intro-
duced the term "knowing" in an environmental statute, but left it to the courts to
interpret the exact definition. See United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir.
1989).
VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE AUDITING
been a bust. In essence, it is now a source of high-level frustra-
tion for both the regulators and the regulated.
On November 14, 1986, in an internal memorandum,
170
Thomas L. Adams, Jr., EPA's Assistant Administrator for En-
forcement and Compliance Monitoring, explained EPA's policy
on the inclusion of environmental auditing provisions in enforce-
ment settlements. 7' At the same time, he indicated that an envi-
ronmental audit is an integral part of a settlement of judicial and
administrative enforcement cases.'72 He made no mention of
EPA's position conveyed in the July 1986 policy statement which
reserves a right for EPA "to act at variance"'73 with its stated
policies and procedures and "to change them at any time without
public notice.'. 74 This means that even the expected leniency by
the enforcement officials during a penalty settlement, based on an
open disclosure of a violation unearthed during a compliance au-
dit, may be an illusion.
This double-talk obviously goes to the core of the regulated
community's current distrust of agency advocacy. A high level of
fear already exists in the corporate world based on the civil and
criminal sanctions contained in several major environmental stat-
utes. The fact that these provisions attach personal liability to
corporate officers and other responsible employees has only add-
ed more distrust.'75 Besides CAAA, several federal environmen-
tal statutes contain provisions for both civil penalties and criminal'
170. ENVIRONMENTAL AUDrrs at App. I (Lawrence B. Cahill & Raymond W.
Kane eds., 6th ed. 1989).
171. Memorandum from Thomas L. Adams, Jr., supra note 35.
172. EPA has often included a comprehensive environmental compliance audit
as a distinct condition of its consent order issued to an alleged violator. See Unit-
ed States v. Menominee Paper Co., No. M88-108 CA 2 (W.D. Mich. July 20,
1990). Not surprisingly, this is becoming a common condition in consent orders
issued by the state regulatory agencies.
173. See Final Auditing Statement, supra note 3, at 25,007.
174. Id. at 25,006.
175. In United States v. A&P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958), the Supreme
Court applied the doctrine of respondeat superior to impute the knowing viola-
tion of an agent to a corporate principal. In People v. Matthews, 7 Cal. App. 4th
1052, 1063 (Ct. App. 1992), the California Court of Appeals commented, in
dicta, that the highest corporate officers must meet the standard to "discover,
prevent, or remedy" environmental violations.
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sanctions against corporate officers and employees. For example,
under CERCLA, any failure to report the release of a hazardous
substance without a permit may result in a fine, imprisonment for
not more than three years (or not more than five years for a sub-
sequent conviction), or both.'76 Civil penalties under most of
these federal environmental statutes, on the other hand, can be as
high as $25,000 per day of violation, with each day constituting a
separate violation.'77 Under CAAA, the latest major federal en-
vironmental statute, for "knowing violations" an individual may
be punished by up to $250,000 in fines and up to five years in
prison, or both, and a corporation may be subject to a maximum
fine of $500,000.178 Additionally, under RCRA, subsequent con-
victions can double the penalties for both individuals and corpo-
rations.'79
The well publicized get-tough approach at the federal, state,
and local agency levels will not be productive in the future with-
out a conciliatory regulatory provision, or at least a policy favor-
ing voluntary compliance audits. 80 In spite of initial enthusiasm
within the business community, the past record for undertaking
voluntary compliance audits, except in real-estate transactions,
has been poor at best. 8' It is a sad reminder of how a well-in-
176. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b), (c), (d)(2) (1994).
177. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1994).
178. The Clean Air Act provides various categories of knowing violations. See
42 U.S.C. § 7413(b), (c) (1994).
179. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1994). Under RCRA, a "knowing endangerment"
may subject a person to a fine of not more than $250,000 or imprisonment for
not more than 15 years, or both. For a corporation, for a similar offense, the fine
may be as high as $1,000,000. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), (e) (1994).
180. Both EPA's and DOJ's recent policies, discussed earlier, indicate that they
will retain full discretion to prosecute despite voluntary disclosure of the compli-
ance audit findings. This approach is also generally being followed by various
state and local enforcement agencies. At the same time, these agencies, particu-
larly EPA and DOJ, have announced plans for more aggressive criminal prosecu-
tions under federal environmental laws. See generally Enforcement, 25 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 48, 2411-12 (Apr. 7, 1995).
181. The traditional common law notion of caveat emptor has found its way
into many state real property laws. This trend has received an additional boost by
the inclusion of the "innocent landowner" defense in CERCLA. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(35)(A), (B), (C) (1994). Hence, in most real estate transactions, the pro-
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tended concept can go awry because of poor planning and a high-
handed approach by a federal agency. To salvage the well mean-
ing intent behind the introduction of compliance audits and to
overcome the current stalemate, there must be a meaningful revi-
sion in EPA's policy.
VIII. THE PROGNOSIS AND POSSIBLE CURE
For the most part, it is agreed that a compliance audit is gener-
ally a good thing and has certain undeniable benefits. EPA and
other regulatory agencies believe that regular compliance audits
will make corporate management more aware of environmental
issues and pitfalls and will allow them to be more pro-active.
This will improve the overall compliance records of the business
community and, thus, foster a more environmentally friendly
business climate.
The business community, too, finds compliance audits an effec-
tive management tool and an efficient way to cure any shortcom-
ings or potential violations without excessive penalties and expen-
sive litigation. The current lack of interest by the business com-
munity to pursue compliance audits as part of ongoing operation-
al plans has been caused by the open disclosure policy of EPA
unmodified by pardon for unknown past or present violations.
This has driven a large wedge between the agencies and the
business community with respect to voluntary compliance audits.
There are other important issues to consider as well. The cur-
rent business climate is increasingly global in scope. As a global
player, a business can hardly ignore its image or be officially
labeled as a "bad actor" in terms of environmental consciousness.
These new realities, including an interest by the corporations to
be "green", have given rise to a spirit of optimism, that perhaps
there is a way out of the current impasse between the regulatory
agencies and the business community. Murray Weidenbaum, the
Director of the Center for the Study of American Business at
Washington University, has suggested that every corporate man-
spective buyer prefers to undertake a voluntary environmental investigation, audit
or assessment of the property in question. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 353(1) (1965); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wood, 418 N.W.2d 408 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1987).
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ager should undertake a complete environmental audit of compa-
ny activities to determine potential problems.
182
Indeed, much can be said for the obvious benefits of a well
planned, comprehensive compliance audit. As the old adage sug-
gests, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. For a
corporation, early detection of an environmental problem can lead
to a quick cure. This, in turn, can save money and improve the
balance sheet of a corporation. Also, a compliance audit allows a
corporation to be a better global citizen, which has value in
today's environmentally conscious climate. With consumer prefer-
ences for "green" products, industries have to put a premium on
TEQM so that their operations are not labeled as anything other
than "green".
As discussed earlier, the current hesitation about undertaking a
compliance audit has its roots in the lack of official incentives.
EPA's confusing 1986 policy8 3 and the tough talk of the en-
forcement officials have all but extinguished the initial enthusi-
asm. As a result, only negative feelings and cynicism exist within
the business community with respect to the benefits of undertak-
ing voluntary compliance audits. From a public policy point of
view, if a compliance audit is not mandated, a forced disclosure
of its findings should be avoided unless there are genuine know-
ing violations. Logic dictates that good deeds should bear tangible
benefits, not increased burdens.
The apparent anomaly in the current status quo is being ad-
dressed, albeit slowly, in political circles. Fortunately, a few
courts have taken a refreshing look at the entire dilemma. In a
recent case, Olen Properties Corp. v. Sheldahl Inc.,"14 a magis-
trate of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia held that environmental audit memoranda can be protected
even in the absence of threatened litigation if the audit process is
properly structured through attorneys. 5 Moreover, on July 22,
182. Robert W. Crandall, Gearing up for Reregulation, BUS. MONTH, July
1989, at 66, 67. This is a personal opinion of a leading specialist in federal regu-
lations. It does not imply that there is a regulatory provision requiring environ-
mental audits by the companies.
183. See Final Auditing Statement, supra note 3.
184. No. CV 91-6446 WDK (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 1994).
185. Id.
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1993, Governor Barbara Roberts of Oregon signed into law land-
mark legislation which created a qualified "environmental audit
privilege."'86 This law allows the regulated community in Ore-
gon to undertake compliance audits and to rectify any existing
violations without the fear of being subject to fines or criminal
sanctions.'87
Several states, including Texas, Mississippi and Virginia, have
recently passed legislation protecting voluntary audits from being
used by state agencies for the purpose of enforcement.'88 A
number of states, including California, New Jersey and Massa-
chusetts, are considering similar legislation that will provide
confidentiality and immunity to environmental violators, provided
they disclose and cure such violations promptly. 9 On May 11,
1994, the Colorado Legislature passed a bill which specifically
creates a privilege for environmental audits.' 9 On April 22,
1995, Kansas adopted audit confidentiality legislation. 9' Cur-
rently, the results of an environmental audit in Kansas are inad-
missible in court and immunity from civil and criminal penalties
will be granted for voluntarily disclosed violations.'92
Several other states, including Indiana and Kentucky, have
186. OR. REv. STAT. § 468.963 (1993). The new law in Oregon originated
from Senate Bill 912 and contains two specific provisos using the carrot and stick
approach. First, it creates a qualified audit privilege so that regulated entities can
perform environmental audits and undertake necessary measures to correct or
prevent environmental violations. Second, it establishes specific state penalties for
environmental violations. See also 1993 Or. Laws 468.963(5).
187. See generally Lindley & Hodson, supra note 4, at 1221.
188. See Hogue, supra note 56, at 882-83.
189. See generally Stephanie N. Mehta & Michael Selz, Small Business Pollut-
ers Get a Chance to Come Clean, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 1995, at B2. Not all
state bills have been passed, however. For example, Arizona's Governor Fife
Symington vetoed S.B. 1290, a bill that would have made the findings of volun-
tary compliance audits inadmissible in legal actions. ARIZ.S.B. 1290, 42nd Leg.,
2d Reg. Sess. (1996).
190. 1994 Colo. Sess. Laws 139. The Colorado bill, S.B. 139, creates an audit
privilege and provides immunity from penalties for entities that self-report and
self-correct any past violations uncovered during the audit.
191. See 1995 Kan. Sess. Laws 76. This new law makes the results of an envi-
ronmental audit inadmissible in court. It also offers immunity from both civil and
criminal penalties for violations voluntarily disclosed to state regulatory agencies.
192. Id.
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enacted laws that provide a qualified privilege to environmental
audits performed voluntarily." 3 Various environmental audit
privilege bills are pending in Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island.'94
Two pending bills'95 in the U.S. Congress provide additional
encouragement to the growing state-level legislative agenda. If
either of these federal bills are passed, they would make the
confidentiality and immunity provisions of various state statutes
an integral part of federal law.
Unfortunately, EPA's position on the state audit privilege law
is anything but conciliatory. EPA has steadfastly and consistently
opposed the privilege approach.'96 EPA has in fact gone on re-
cord by indicating that the audit privilege provided by the state
statutes may be challenged by EPA.'97 EPA alleges that the
penalty immunity provisions of these statutes allow the violators
to retain the economic benefit derived from past non-compli-
ance.
198
193. See 1994 Ind. Acts 16 (effective July 1, 1994); 1994 Ky. Acts 430 (effec-
tive Apr. 11, 1994).
194. See generally Michael K. Ohm et al., RCRA Criminal Liability: Acts,
Consequences and Prevention, 30 CHEM. WASTE LIT. REP. No. 2, at 230, 260
(July 1995).
195. H.R. 1047, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (drafted by Rep. Joel Hefley of
Colorado) and S.2371, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (introduced by Sen. Mark
Hatfield of Oregon).
196. See generally News and Development, EPA Issues Interim Audit Policy As
More States Adopt Audit Privilege Laws, 4 Envtl. Due Diligence Guide (BNA)
No. 4, at 1 (Apr. 1995).
197. Ira R. Feldman, Special Counsel for EPA's Office of Compliance and
Chairman of EPA's Auditing Policy Group, told the Bureau of National Affairs
that EPA is neither bound by state audit privilege laws nor precluded from en-
forcing violations of federal laws. State Environmental Audit Privilege Laws, Ef-
fects on Enforcement Undergoing EPA Review, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 11,
495 (July 15, 1994). This warning has also come from DOJ. See News and De-
velopment, EPA to Gather More Data on Audit Policy; DOJ May Challenge New
State Audit Laws, 3 Envtl. Due Diligence Guide (BNA) No. 9, at 69 (Sept.
1994)[hereinafter News and Development].
198. This is the cornerstone of EPA's opposition to immunity for past viola-
tions. EPA argues that such violators, if allowed to go unpunished, will be deriv-
ing economic benefits over their competitors who complied with relavent envi-
ronmental laws.
1996] VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE AUDITING 855
However, EPA's position is not cast in stone. EPA's latest
audit policy statement, issued as an interim policy on April 3,
1995, indicates certain changes from its 1986 policy on environ-
mental audits. 99 The interim policy is purely incentive-based.
Corporations will be able to completely bypass gravity-based or
punitive penalties if they voluntarily identify, disclose and correct
violations.2"
In order to be eligible, a corporation must act in good faith and
satisfy seven specific criteria"' emphasizing self-correction and
voluntary disclosure of its violation." 2 Moreover, EPA will not
refer criminal violations to DOJ if the corporation satisfies three
additional conditions.2"3
199. EPA's interim policy statement of April 3, 1995 supersedes its July 1986
policy and clearly indicates, for the first time, that EPA will not seek out volun-
tary environmental audit findings to trigger enforcement investigations. EPA,
however, still opposes federal legislation to avoid penalties for environmental
violations uncovered during voluntary audits. See Interim Policy, supra note 7.
200. See Interim Policy, supra note 7.
201. EPA's Interim Policy does not offer any protection to individuals. The
seven mitigating criteria for a corporation are discussed later. See infra note 203
and accompanying text.
202. Self-policing, self-correction and prompt disclosure constitute the basic
ingredients of the seven principles propounded in EPA's Interim Policy. Interim
Policy, supra note 7 at 16,876.
203. EPA's Interim Policy of April 3, 1995 identifies the following seven
criteria which must be met by an entity in order to have its civil penalty reduced:
(1) discovery of the violation through a voluntary environmental audit;
(2) disclosure of the violation fully, voluntarily and in writing to ap-
propriate agency officials immediately upon its discovery and before
an agency inspection or notice of a citizen suit or a complaint is filed;
(3) correction of the violation within 60 days of its discovery, or as
soon as possible if additional time is required;
(4) expeditious remediation of any condition that has created or may
create an imminent and substantial endangerment to human health or
the environment;
(5) implementation of appropriate measures to correct environmental
harm caused, and prevention of its recurrences;
(6) demonstration that appropriate steps have been taken to avoid re-
peat violations; and
(7) cooperation with EPA, and offer of information as necessary and
required by EPA to determine applicability of its policy.
Id. The Department of Justice, not being a party to EPA's interim policy, acts
856 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
There are, however, no mitigation provisions in the interim
policy for situations where "serious actual harm" occurs. In cases
that present a substantial risk of a serious harm, but no actual
occurrence of a serious harm, corporations will be eligible for a
75 percent gravity-based penalty reduction."
EPA's new interim policy does not provide the full extent of
relief that corporations seek from voluntary compliance audits
and correcting past violations promptly. Nor does it contain the
provisions that various state statutes currently provide. EPA's
proposal based on its "seven plus three" conditions 5 emphasiz-
ing self correction, voluntary disclosure and management com-
plicity may not satisfy those who seek full immunity based on
uncovering, correcting and disclosing past violations voluntarily.
The new interim policy, however, is a significant movement from
EPA's original position and provides new incentives for disclo-
sure and prompt correction of violations discovered during audits.
It is important to note that as part of its new policy, EPA will
not request voluntary environmental audits for the purpose of ini-
tiating civil or criminal enforcement actions against an alleged
on violations referred to it by EPA. Pursuant to its interim policy, EPA will
not refer actions to DOJ if the entity demonstrates that its violation did not
include the following three practices:
(1) a prevalent corporate management philosophy or practice of con-
cealment or condonement of environmental violations;
(2) any conscious involvement in or willful blindness to the violation
by high-level corporate officials or managers; and
(3) any serious actual harm to human health or the environment.
Id. at 16,878.
Notwithstanding, EPA has opposed legislation that could establish any
privilege or immunity for past violations voluntarily disclosed. See News and
Development, supra note 197, at 69. Instead, it has stressed prosecutorial dis-
cretion, thus suggesting leniency over such violations, but not complete immu-
nity. See generally, Paul J. Curran & Gregory J. Wallace, Environmental Law,
NAT'L L.J., July 31, 1995, at B4.
204. This is an exception rather than the rule. EPA may mitigate up to 75
percent of the unadjusted gravity component of the penalty in cases where most,
but not necessarily all of the seven specific criteria are met. See Interim Policy,
supra note 7, at 16,877.
205. Id.
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violator."° Moreover, EPA emphasizes that its interim policy
will not limit the right of regulated entities to claim common law
evidentiary privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege and
the work product privilege. However, the interim policy does not
rule out the use of information received from voluntary disclosure
of audit findings and reports for the purpose of either civil or
criminal proceedings. 7
Even where an uncertainty may exist regarding forced disclo-
sure of the findings of a compliance audit, the constitutional
protection against self-incrimination does provide some legal
defense. Although the protection is limited in scope and protects
only an individual, and not a corporation, against a criminal pros-
ecution, it may be a strong argument against the agencies' arbi-
trary and capricious policies.
Judge William Wilkins, Jr. of the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit and a member of the U.S. Sentencing Commission,
indicated that the November 1993 sentencing guidelines incor-
porate the theory that the penalties for an offending corporation
should be reduced if it voluntarily discloses violations."8 Ac-
cording to Judge Wilkins, the Commission believes that probation
should also be accorded to such a corporation if it cooperates
with authorities and sets up a vigorous compliance program.2"
Above all, the good news is that EPA has yet to drop the final
curtain on its enforcement policy on voluntary compliance audits.
206. Id. at 16,878.
207. Id. at 16,879. EPA has repeatedly indicated that any application of its
interim policy is purely discretionary and that EPA may change its policy at any
time without public notice. See Final Auditing Statement, supra note 3, at 25,007.
208. The Commission was created by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub.
L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1994). The
Sentencing Guidelines for all crimes were issued in November 1987. The Organi-
zational Sentencing Guidelines of the Commission, originally issued in 1991,
provide for a reduced sentence of a convicted organization if it has implemented
an effective program to prevent and detect violations and reports such violations
to, and cooperates with, the enforcement agencies. This provision has not been
amended in the draft Sentencing Guidelines issued by the United States Sen-
tencing Commission in November 1993. See New Draft on Sentencing Corpora-
tions for Environmental Crimes Released for Review, supra note 31, at 1331.
209. See Lines Drawn at Hearing on Self-Audits; Industry Representatives
Favor Privilege, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 587 (July 29, 1994).
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In fact, EPA has gone on record that it is still evaluating its own
policy and is willing to reconsider its current strategy of disclo-
sure. On May 13, 1994, Steven Herman, Assistant EPA Adminis-
trator for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, issued a mem-
orandum ° disclosing EPA's plan to reassess its policy regard-
ing environmental compliance audits.2 ' Since then, there have
been numerous official and unofficial overtures by EPA officials
indicating EPA's strong encouragement for environmentally
sound business practices, including performance of compliance
audits.2"2 It can only be hoped that the U.S. Congress and per-
haps the U.S. Supreme Court will appreciate the present anomaly
and will, once and for all, put the current controversy regarding
compliance audits to rest by providing a clear message. Mean-
while, it is extremely important that EPA and DOJ, two staunch
advocates for disclosure of voluntary environmental audit find-
ings, resolve the profound question whether a privilege should be
recognized when it promotes sufficiently important interests to
outweigh the need for probative evidence.213
CONCLUSION
Until both the judiciary and the agencies clarify the contours of
protection afforded voluntary compliance audits, a prudent corpo-
ration may undertake a voluntary compliance audit by making
210. Steven Herman, Agency Policy on Environmental Audits Undergoing
Reassessment, Offical Says, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 231 (June 3, 1994).
211. The memorandum suggests EPA's willingness to hear a wide range of
views on environmental audits. It also implies that EPA's enforcement policies
based on audit findings are not rigid.
212. See Open Mike Session on Environmental Auditing; Announcement of
Environmental Auditing Policy Docket, 60 Fed. Reg. 3639 (1995). EPA conduct-
ed an "open mike" session on January 20, 1995, to provide an opportunity for
public comments on whether additional incentives are needed to encourage self-
disclosure and correction of environmental violations discovered during environ-
mental audits. This type of session is a clear indication of EPA's willingness to
reassess its policy with respect to the environmental audits and to seek more
cooperation from the industry. See Steven Herman, EPA Assistant Administrator
for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, in News and Developments, EPA to
Gather More Data on Audit Policy; DOJ May Challenge New State Audit Laws,
3 Envtl. Due Diligence Guide (BNA) No. 9, 69 (Sept. 1994).
213. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
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sure that the findings of the audit can be protected under the
doctrines of privilege discussed earlier. Obviously, such audits
should be directed by attorneys with the proper participation of
technical consultants and other experts. This may lend credence
to a casual observation by the late William McGowan, past
Chairman and founder of MCI Corporation, indicating that the
best investment he ever made was in lawyers.214 Hence, al-
though there is no guaranteed safe harbor in environmental com-
pliance auditing, one may have the solace of some legal protec-
tion over the findings of such an audit if it is planned and execut-
ed correctly.
214. See Crandall, supra note 182, at 68.
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